

**N. Khazratova**

University of Warmia and Mazury, Olsztyn, Poland

e-mail: [nigora.khazratova@uwm.edu.pl](mailto:nigora.khazratova@uwm.edu.pl)

## PECULIARITIES OF THE MANIPULATIVE- GAME INTERACTION BETWEEN THE CITIZEN AND THE STATE

Distrust in the relationship between the citizen and the state leads to the dominance of manipulative-gaming interaction, which hinders both the development of civic identity and the establishment of partnerships between the citizen and the state. The aim of the article is a further conceptualization the doctrine of healthy and deformed relations between the individual and the state (in particular, analysis of the manipulative-gaming interaction between the citizen and the state. The theoretical model of “civic games” presented earlier is complemented by the concept of symmetrical and asymmetrical games practiced in the relations between the individual and the state. This concept is substantiated by the description of games initiated by the state: a game that is a “mirror image” of the civic game “Parasite”, as well as the asymmetrical game “Fighting Corruption”.

The scientific value of the article is related to the application of the doctrine of transactional analysis to the relations between the citizen and the state; its practical value lies in the disclosure of forms of manipulative-gaming interaction, which opens up the possibility of finding ways to replace it with rational partnerships. Eric Berne’s transactional analysis and the self-agency’s approach were used as the methodological basis for our research. Conclusion: manipulative-gaming interaction replace a healthy relationship between the individual and the state. It expresses itself in the so-called games (in Berne’s understanding), which are a surrogate for healthy relationships and are aimed at achieving a psychological (political) benefits that imitates the solution of existing problems. The author analyzes a pair of symmetrical games – “Parasite” and “Give me everything for your own benefit” – as well as an asymmetrical game initiated by the state – “Fighting Corruption”.

**Key words:** civic identity, games, manipulative interaction, relations, state.

Н. Хазратова

Вармия-Мазури университеті, Ольштын, Польша

e-mail: [nigora.khazratova@uwm.edu.pl](mailto:nigora.khazratova@uwm.edu.pl)

### Азаматтар мен мемлекет арасындағы манипуляциялық-ойын әрекетінің ерекшеліктері

Азамат пен мемлекет арасындағы қарым-қатынаста болатын сенімсіздік манипуляциялық-ойын өзара әрекеттесуінің үстемдігіне әкеледі, бұл азаматтық бірегейліктің дамуына да, олардың арасындағы серіктестік қатынастардың орнатылуына да кедергі келтіреді. Бұл мақаланың мақсаты – жеке тұлға мен мемлекет арасында қалыптасқан салауатты және деформацияланған қатынастарды зерттеуді одан әрі тұжырымдау (атап айтқанда, азамат пен мемлекеттің манипуляциялық және ойын өзара әрекеттесуін талдау). Бұрын автор жасаған, мемлекет бастамашылық еткен ойындардың сипаттамасымен негізделген «азаматтық ойындардың» теориялық моделі: «Паразит» азаматтық ойынының «айна бейнесі» болып табылатын ойын, сондай-ақ «сыбайлас жемқорлыққа қарсы күрес» асимметриялық ойыны мақалада ұсынылған жеке тұлға мен мемлекет қатынастарында қолданылатын симметриялы және асимметриялық ойындар тұжырымдамасымен толықтырылады.

Зерттеудің әдіснамалық негізі ретінде Эрик Берннің транзакциялық талдауы және өзіндік агенттік тәсілі қолданылды. Мақалада осындай симметриялы ойындар – «Паразит» және «маған өз пайдаңыз үшін бәрін беріңіз», сондай-ақ мемлекет бастаған асимметриялық ойын – «сыбайлас жемқорлыққа қарсы күрес» талданады. Зерттеу барысында манипуляциялық ойын өзара әрекеттесуі жеке тұлға мен мемлекеттің салауатты қарым-қатынасын алмастырады деген қорытындыға келді. Ол салауатты қарым-қатынастың суррогаты болып табылатын және бар мәселелерді шешуге еліктейтін психологиялық (саяси) пайдаға қол жеткізуге (Берн түсінігінде) бағытталған ойындар деп аталады. Мақаланың ғылыми құндылығы осы жерде ілімнің қолданылуымен анықталады азамат пен мемлекеттің қарым-қатынасына транзакциялық талдау

практикалық құндылығы манипуляциялық-ойын өзара әрекеттесу нысандарын ашу болып табылады, бұл оны ұтымды серіктестіктермен алмастыру жолдарын табуға мүмкіндік береді.

**Түйін сөздер:** азаматтық сәйкестілік, ойындар, манипуляциялық өзара әрекет, қарым-қатынас, мемлекет.

Н. Хазратова

Варминьско-Мазурский университет, Ольштын, Польша  
e-mail: nigora.khazratova@uwm.edu.pl

### **Особенности манипулятивно-игрового взаимодействия граждан с государством**

Недоверие, существующее в отношениях гражданина и государства, приводит к доминированию манипулятивно-игрового взаимодействия, что препятствует как развитию гражданской идентичности, так и установлению партнерских отношений между ними. Целью данной статьи является дальнейшая концептуализация исследования здоровых и деформированных отношений, сложившихся между личностью и государством (в частности, анализ манипулятивно-игрового взаимодействия гражданина и государства). Теоретическая модель «гражданских игр», созданная ранее автором, обоснованная описанием игр, инициированных государством: игры, являющейся «зеркальным отражением» гражданской игры «Паразит», а также асимметричной игры «Борьба с коррупцией», дополняется представленной в статье концепцией симметричных и асимметричных игр, практикуемых в отношениях личности и государства.

В качестве методологической основы исследования были использованы транзактный анализ Эрика Берна и подход самоагентности. В статье анализируются такие симметричные игры — «Паразит» и «Отдай мне все ради собственной выгоды», а также асимметричную игру, инициированную государством — «Борьба с коррупцией». В ходе проведения исследования был сделан вывод, что манипулятивно-игровое взаимодействие подменяет здоровые отношения личности и государства. Оно выражается в так называемых играх (в понимании Берна), которые являются суррогатом здоровых отношений и направлены на достижение психологической (политической) выгоды, имитирующей решение существующих проблем. Научная ценность статьи определяется тем, что здесь было использовано учение о транзактном анализе к отношениям гражданина и государства; практическая ценность статьи заключается в раскрытии форм манипулятивно-игрового взаимодействия, что открывает возможность поиска путей его замены рациональными партнерствами.

**Ключевые слова:** гражданская идентичность, игры, манипулятивное взаимодействие, отношения, государство.

### **Introduction**

Background and relevance of the topic. The relevance of the problem of psychological interaction between a citizen and the state has been growing steadily in recent years due to the political, economic, social-psychological changes taking place in the global political space. States are defending their borders, resisting external aggression, and changing their role in the global community; citizens are actively migrating and, as a result, acquiring citizenship of other countries and leaving the citizenship of the previous ones or acquiring dual or triple citizenship. All of this has a significant impact on civic identity, which develops or degrades under the influence of the enormous political upheavals and stresses that characterize contemporary reality. It is not only civic identity that is undergoing deformation, but also the typical ways of interaction between the citizen and the state.

Traditionally, the problem of interaction between a citizen and the state is analyzed as a problem of civic identity (which, in our opinion, is a significant narrowing of the problem) and is studied from this perspective. A certain intensification of research on civic identity was caused by the expansion of the European Union; both civic and so-called European (civilizational) identity were studied. However, discussions about the very phenomenon of civic identity, its ontological essence, are still ongoing.

Civic identity is often combined with the concepts of national and ethnic identity (Cohen et. al., 2013; Constant et. al., 2012, Curticean, 2007), and it is analyzed in the broad context of political behavior (Duckitt et. al., 2016), as well as daily activities related to the formation of pro-active attitudes towards civic participation (Krzywosz-Rynkiewicz et. al., 2011).

D. Sekulić and J. Sporer (2008) claim that civic identity is a “broader” concept than ethnic identi-

ty. L. Hristova and A. Sekik (2013) described four types of relationship between civil and ethnic identity.

J. Pakulski and B. Tranter consider both nation and society as «imaginary communities», but define them differently. Society is seen as a large voluntary (civil) association, which is the main object of social affection and solidarity.

This is expressed in the institution of citizenship, a “strong” civic identity, and civic engagement. Membership in a society is seen as a matter of voluntary commitment, not of birth and/or kinship. Membership in society imposes moral obligations that are consistent with an understanding of civic rights and responsibilities (which includes compliance with the law) (Pakulski et. al., 2000).

I. Zhadan focuses on civic competencies, which implies the possibility of learning by obtaining information and practicing the necessary skills. She distinguishes four levels of civic self-identification: sign representation, interpretation of meanings, construction of meanings, and construction of conditions and rules for transforming reality. And the indicators of civic identification include subjective self-identification, locus of control of social responsibility, need for freedom, practices of civic interaction, possible “I” of the subject of civic interaction and strategies for achieving them, models of civic activity, time orientation, remoteness of power, integration into the civic community, and the meaning (goals) of citizenship (Zhadan, 2017).

We believe that the arguments of T. Bevez, who distinguishes political and legal competence, political activity, civic participation, and a sense of civic community in the content of civic identity, are correct, but we note that political activity is not a mandatory marker of civic identity, but rather of political identity (awareness of belonging to various political structures – socio-political organizations, political parties), which usually implies active political participation (Bevez, 2014).

We should agree with Petrovska I., who considers civic identity as a type of organizational identity, which is a valuable and meaningful experience that allows an individual to identify himself as a citizen of the state. It promotes the integration of personal attitudes toward citizenship, even as civic values/orientations change, and acts as a psychological regulator of civic behavior (Petrovska, 2021).

The author offers her own concept of healthy and surrogate relations between the individual and the state. While healthy relations involve rational exchange (for example, a citizen pays taxes – the

state ensures order and security for the citizen), surrogate relations involve their imitation in the form of games (in the sense of E. Berne) (Petrovska, 2019).

According to E. Berne, a game is understood as a series of mutually complementary repeated transactions which have a hidden motive and generate psychological profits for all players (such as self-justification, self-affirmation, revenge, etc.) (Berne, 1964). Surrogate relations can take place not only between individuals, but also between the citizen and the organization, with the state in particular. Their surrogacy lies in the fact that they serve as substitutes for healthy relations that involve the exchange of mutually beneficial and necessary transactions.

There are descriptions of, among other things, five types of the most typical games between a citizen and the state: “Persecution” (“The state oppresses me”), «Patriot» (“Only I love my country”), «Offended» («If not for this State”), «Parasite» (“You’ll pay me”) and “Labor Heroism” (“I make such a sacrifice for you”). These games are a type of manipulation by a citizen in relation to the state in order to gain psychological benefits (self-justification, justification of their own passivity or career failures, illicit enrichment, expression of resentment towards the state, etc.) (Khazratova et. al., 2024).

Summarizing the above, it should be noted that ethno-national identity implies identification with a representative of one’s own ethnic/national community (respectively, with speakers of one’s native language, ethnic culture, customs and traditions, etc.), while civic identity implies identification with a citizen of the state regardless of ethno-national identity, on the basis of belonging (“citizenship”) to a particular state. Thus, a citizen identifies with fellow citizens who have common organizational and legal problems of functioning in a given state and are looking for common solutions (Khazratova, 2015).

In our opinion, the reality of staying and functioning in the state for a citizen today is often stressful and traumatic. For example, the state declares quarantine and lockdown during a pandemic, conducts forced vaccination, carries out armed aggression against another state, and forces its citizens to kill and risk their own lives. The state justifies any coercion by the necessity and concern for citizens, which does not always inspire their trust. All of this has a significant impact on civic identity, which is increasingly moving away from healthy forms and acquiring various deviations.

At the same time, the stressfulness of reality alone is not a sufficient factor in the anomalization

of civic identity. There are examples when threats to the state (internal or external) led to civic consolidation and the recovery of civic identity. Obviously, the decisive factor is, among other things, the focus of the state's measures – either to protect the declared values (e.g., political freedoms and opportunities) or to move away from them and realize goals that are essentially opposite. It is also important that this orientation of the state's measures is reflected and interpreted in a certain way by the personality of each citizen, and it is this understanding of the state (“image of the state”) that determines the outcome of a citizen's transaction in interaction with the state. As we can see, this is a complex process in which not only the citizen, but also the state as an organization of society and a party to the interaction plays an active role.

This suggests that the analysis of the manipulative game interaction between the individual and the state should be realized not only in the context of the problem of civic identity, but in a broader context – the psychology of relations between the citizen and the state.

**The goal of** our article is to further conceptualize the doctrine of healthy and deformed relations between the individual and the state (in particular, those manifested in the form of manipulative game interaction).

This goal can be achieved by fulfilling the following **tasks**:

1. Determination of the main paradigms of relations between the individual citizen and the state as an organization of society and, on this basis, healthy (normal) and deformed forms of civic identity;
2. Identification of the main psychological features of manipulative and gaming interaction between the individual and the state (games);
3. Analyzing the role of the state in the manipulative game interaction of the citizen and the state;
4. Description and analysis of relevant games initiated by the state itself and beneficial to it.

The conceptual development of this approach can be carried out using such methods of theoretical analysis as: systematic approach, techniques of analogy, deduction and induction.

#### **Paradigms of relations between the individual and the state as a criterion for determining healthy and unhealthy civic identity**

The tradition of analyzing the relationship between the individual and the state originated with K. Jung. He recognized the problem of redirecting the responsibility of the citizen to the state, which increases the primacy (activity) of the state and is

responsible for the citizens' secondary status and dependence (Jung, 1958). His understanding of the problem, as well as the subject-oriented/ self-agency approach (Brushlinsky, 1996; Tatenko, 2006), give us the basis for identifying four paradigms of relations between the individual and the state, which can serve as criteria for the presence or absence of manipulative-gaming attitudes in interaction.

On this basis it can be considered four types of relationship between the individual and the state:

1) Object-subject – the citizen assumes the role of an object (secondary, dependent on the state) (“I am a small person, nothing depends on me”), whereas the state plays the role of a subject that makes decisions about the citizens' lives and is responsible for everything;

2) Subject-object – the citizen regards himself/herself as an active party in his/her relationship with the state, and sees the state as an unnecessary and harmful bureaucratic mechanism. As a result, the citizen feels entitled to deceive the “mechanism” and to “circumvent” its laws and rules;

3) Object-object – is a stressful and potentially traumatic relationship. The citizen sees the state as a depersonalized senseless mechanism, but also considers himself/herself an unnecessary and insignificant cog in this mechanism. Individuals perceive the state, its citizens, and the relationship between the state and its citizens as absurd and unjustified.

4) Subject-subject: the individual assumes responsibility for his/her life in the state, understands the problems and the goals of the state as an organization. The state respects the citizen, and the models for the development of the economy, infrastructure, and society generally aim to satisfy citizen needs (Khazratova, 2004).

Object-subject and subject-object paradigms lead to a distorting the relationship between the individual and the state. The object-object paradigm dehumanizes interactions and their participants, leads to the greatest distortions in civic identity. Fourth paradigm promotes equal development of both the individual and the state (Khazratova, 2004) and is optimal, but it rarely implements. In this context, the question arises of distinguishing between healthy (normal) and unhealthy relations between the individual and the state, as well as between healthy and deformed civic identity. As noted above, the subject-object, object-subject, and even more so the object-object paradigms underlie deformed relations between the individual and the state: at least one of the partners is interpreted as an object, i.e., its

intentions are considered secondary and dependent on the other.

Each of these varieties – healthy and unhealthy civic identity based on healthy or unhealthy relationships – contains, in our opinion, some other subtypes.

1. A healthy civic identity can be either mature or immature (underdeveloped). An immature civic identity can be considered healthy if it is present in a child or adolescent whose personality and social identity structure are not yet fully developed. Such a civic identity is in the process of development (the dynamics of which can be anything – high, low, or abrupt) and is in balance with other social identities. However, an underdeveloped civic identity in an adult and socially adapted person should be considered an anomaly, a deformation.

2. A deformed civic identity can be: a) abnormally immature; b) situationally deformed; c) stably deformed. Deformation of civic identity occurs as a response to adverse influences from the state (we are talking about both the state of citizenship and the state of an external aggressor, the state of emigrant preferences, etc.) In some cases, an absence/unforming of civic identity may have adaptive value (for example, in a “disputed” territory, where borders and sovereignty often change, the ability to quickly change one’s citizenship and identity may be an important survival skill).

Such deformation can be temporary and disappear without a trace later (for example, when moving to another country), or it can remain for life.

One of the deformations of civic identity (temporary or stable) is the manipulative attitude of a citizen towards the state, which forces him or her to engage in game/scenario interaction with it.

### Literature review

The main psychological features of the manipulative and gaming interaction of a citizen with the state (game):

1. It should be noted that we distinguish these features based on the work of E. Berne, with the only difference being that E. Berne considered these features in the context of interpersonal transactions (Berne, 1964), while we consider person-organization transactions, meaning in particular such a specific organization as the state.

Repetition of transactions in interaction, repetition of the result (which can be potentially traumatic) and the problem that prompts these transactions.

As E. Berne noted, the game gradually turns into a life scenario.

2. The presence of an ulterior motive for manipulative-gaming interaction – the so-called psychological benefit. Both the citizen and the state may be interested in psychological benefit. While for a citizen a psychological benefit may consist in self-justification, self-assertion, and the use of state structures in personal interests. For the state it is the improvement of its image, the use of citizen resources without any compensation, and the approval of directions and strategies for the development of society that do not meet the interests of citizens.

3. The absence of a solution to the existing problem in the entire series of transactions between the individual and the state.

### «Symmetrical» and «asymmetrical» games

Games in the interaction between the individual and the state in the concept of I. Petrovska were described as those initiated by the citizen and carried out by him for the sake of obtaining psychological gain (which is only a surrogate for the real solution of the citizen’s real problem in his relations with the state) (Petrovska, 2021). But can it really be assumed that manipulative-game interaction between the citizen and the state is always initiated by the citizen?

In the logic of any bilateral relationship, both parties are a priori active in the relationship – regardless of whether it is an interpersonal or intergroup (inter-organizational) relationship. Activity means not only that the initiator of transactions is alternately one or the other party, but also that each party actively responds to the other’s transactions by interpreting and accepting them. And each subsequent transaction is a response to the previous transactions of the other party. Therefore, even if one party “uses” the other as an object to realize its own goals, this is somehow accepted by the other party. It follows that in the manipulative-game interaction of an individual with the state, the latter is also a priori active.

Following Berne’s postulates, we take it as an axiom that all players receive some psychological benefit from the game (otherwise they would have no motivation to participate). And yet, the initiator of the game pursues primarily his own benefit and is likely to win more. Therefore, in different situations, each party may offer/impose its own game, which gives the prospect of greater gain. Therefore, we can describe games initiated by a citizen, but also games initiated by the state as an organization.

Such a game can be a mirror image of a similar game of the previous initiator – let's call it symmetrical.

Given this, it would be logical to consider and analyze the relevant games between the citizen and the state from the standpoint of the initiative of the parties and the psychological (political) gains of the main players. In this case, the described and analyzed games of citizens could be supplemented by games initiated and supported by the state.

Such symmetrical games may include, first of all, games aimed at achieving material and financial gains by one party (increasing its resources) at the expense of the other party through manipulation, i.e., a seemingly reasonable (but in fact false) demand to give/share/compensate for non-existent merits or expenses of the first party.

This is the case, in particular, with the pair of games "Parasite" (the citizen's game) and "Give me everything you have for your own benefit" (the state's game). Let us consider them sequentially according to the scheme developed by E. Berne.

This game analysis scheme includes: 1) thesis (the main purpose of the game); 2) goal (psychological gain for the main player); 3) roles; 4) paradigm (the most critical transactions at the socio-psychological level); 5) main moves in the game; 6) rewards; 7) antithesis (the ability to stop the game, reorient the main player to a more productive relationship) (Berne, 1964).

Exiting occlusion, according to the postulates of transactional analysis, always means transition to the position of the Adult (according to Berne's theory, the Adult is a sub-personality that is fundamentally different from the Parent and Child, who actually enter the game through mutually complementary transactions). The Adult organizes social interactions on the basis of respect for the partner, apriori equality of rights with him ("You are OK, I am OK"), mutual responsibility, so games are impossible here. It is from the Adult's position that a sincere, not a substitute partnership.

### Materials and methods

"Parasite" (a civic game)

1) Main thesis: "You owe me and you will pay!" Here, the role of the persecutor is played by the Beneficiary who is diligently looking for opportunities to receive support from the State, to collect benefits, including through fraud.

2) Psychological benefit: implementation of hidden aggression against the State, social parasitism, self-affirmation.

3) Roles: the Beneficiary( Parasite) usually works in the public sector, never hesitates to declare his/her "rights"; for example, a Chernobyl victim, a single mother, a widow of an ATO veteran; State Representatives – for example, trade union employees, tax inspectors, accountants; Colleagues – for example, employees who do not have benefits and self-affirm in another way.

4) Paradigm: subject-object. The Beneficiary is an active, dissatisfied and aggressive consumer of State services. The State is the object, and the Beneficiary has no interest in the State's problems.

5) Main moves: a) the Beneficiary declares his/her rights; b) develops an aggressive attitude to any objections from State Representatives; defends his/her privileges even when they do not give him a pragmatic benefit; c) enters into a hidden confrontation with the Colleagues, possibly to compensate for the fact that the Beneficiary is not fully entitled to his/her benefits and "rights".

6) Rewards: the Beneficiary expresses hidden aggression, receives a material and financial benefit. The Colleagues, become asserted by the Beneficiary's loss ("Don't be a parasite, earn with professionalism), if they are opposed to him/her; or become asserted by the Beneficiary's success ("He proved his/her rights to our fraudulent state"), if they support him/her.

7) Exit: satisfaction from well-deserved earnings; trust in one's potential; experiencing solidarity with the State's problems; working towards a solution to the State's problems.

A similar game, initiated not by a citizen but by the state, can be called:

### «Give me everything you have – for your own profit» (a state game)

1) The main thesis: "You are in my debt from the moment you were born. You owe me everything you have, therefore I have the moral and legal right to take it all. I am doing this for your/social profit."

2) Psychological benefit: justification of complete domination, transformation of a citizen with rights into a powerless subject. Moral reproach, unjustified self-aggrandizement and self-justification.

3) Roles: The State exploits the Subordinate, forcing him to work hard without sufficient remuneration, to give up his finances/property or life to protect the State. The Subordinate is disenfranchised, chained by fear of losing everything, but in

the hope that his life, time and body are his inalienable property. State Enforcer – a representative of a territorial military recruitment center or an organization that overloads the Subordinate with labor; a police officer. Ideologue (also known as propagandist, publicist) – a leader of public opinion who informs the Subordinate and justifies the position of the State from a logical, moral and legal standpoint.

4) The subject-object paradigm. This is the clearest form, the most open manifestation of the application of this paradigm.

5) The main movements are: a) The State finds itself in a difficult situation/ crisis or declares it; b) It appeals to the Subordinate to sacrifice what he has (finances, property, his life, the lives of his loved ones) for the common good (overcoming the crisis, protection from the enemy, etc.); c) The Ideologist justifies why such a sacrifice is absolutely necessary, and the State Enforcer forces the Subordinate to make this sacrifice; d) the Subordinate donates, time passes, nothing changes; e) the Ideologue continues to complain about the difficulties in the State (economic crisis, natural disasters, external aggression) and pushes for new donations.

6) Rewards: The State receives the image of the Victim, which entitles it to support, assistance, empathy and various kinds of donations from everywhere; the Subordinate receives the masochistic pleasure of self-destruction in favor of the State and loyalty from it (the pleasure is enhanced if he simultaneously observes the punishment of less loyal Citizens); the State Enforcer and the Ideologue enjoy their situational power over the Subordinate (the former – physical, the latter – manipulative).

7) Exit from the game: public awareness of the role of victims on the part of the Subordinate in the course of public dialogue (if the situation has not changed over time, therefore, victims on his side did not play a decisive role); recognition of the ineffectiveness of such public administration and rejection of the position of exploitation.

In both cases, the game is driven by an attempt to obtain an unlawful and unjustified benefit from the other party (in the game “Parasite” – by a citizen who takes a position of social parasitism, from the state; in the game “Give me everything you have – for your own profit” – by the state, which ruthlessly exploits the citizen). A couple of the games described above are symmetrical, since they are based on a similar motive and are realized by a certain analogy. However, there are also asymmetric games, those that have no analogues at the initiative of the other party.

One of these games is the one usually initiated by the state – the “Fighting Corruption”. Let’s describe it according to the scheme below.

#### «Fighting Corruption»

1) The main thesis: “We are mercilessly fighting corruption in our country, wait until we destroy it one day.”

2) Psychological benefit: getting a credit of public trust for the very intention to destroy corruption, postponing the moment of “starting an honest life”, creating a screen from the fuss around corruption; the opportunity to leave everything as it is;

3) Roles: The State in this game plays a dual role: a) The State that breaks free from the chains of corruption; b) The Corrupted State. (Un)Corrupt Citizen – wants to earn more money, but does not see “honest” ways; Anti-Corruption Fighters – search for and expose Corruptors; Corruptor – a citizen who has enriched himself dishonestly at the expense of the State.

4) Subject-object paradigm: public officials strongly oppose corruption and at the same time make it impossible to fight it.

5) Main movements: The state announces the fight against corruption; (Un)Corrupt Citizens dream of an honest and safe life without lies; Anti-Corruption Fighters hunt down the Corrupt and expose him; he bribes the Fighters and they release him after several ritualistic actions: TV exposure, public condemnation, and taking away funds. The Anti-Corruption Fighters look for the next Corrupt official to do the same thing to; eventually, the Anti-Corruption Fighters become Corrupt officials themselves. The (Non)Corrupt Citizen is also involved in transactions, although he is not allowed to make a lot of money: he is allowed to “earn” a little, and formally he is also involved in illegal transactions. This keeps him silent. In the end, there are no influential people left in the State except for the Corrupt, and it is they who create the rules and ensure exchange, the economy, regulate financial flows and the exercise of power. It turns out that the State is based on corruption and cannot exist without it.

6) Exit the game: realizing that the fight against corruption always generates more corruption. Corruption disappears when it becomes unprofitable and inexpedient. Public control over the activities of high-ranking officials and transparency of legal and financial processes can help to exit the game, although it is important to realize that this game is the most addictive.

The specificity of the State’s role in this game is its variability, the presence of two opposing inten-

tions: to destroy corruption and at the same time to preserve it. It appears to be a two-faced Janus, both a victim of corruption and a biased corrupt official. It seems that she deliberately deceives the (Un)Corrupt Citizen when she declares the fight against corruption. In fact, the State is interested in eradicating corruption to the extent that it impedes its development. Corruption does not destroy the state completely, but it significantly impedes its development and causes its primitive functioning. When it comes to serious reforms, the system seeks self-preservation and reproduces itself. The state is constantly moving “away” from corruption and “toward” it, remaining within a certain “corridor” beyond which it does not go. However, the “expansion” of this corridor is still possible.

### Results and discussion

The described games are characterized by certain regularities.

First of all, it should be emphasized that we are talking about unhealthy, suboptimal (deformed) forms of interaction between the individual and the state. Even if at first glance it seems that one party benefits the other, the interaction is based on inauthentic, deformed relations between the citizen and the state (they can be based on fear, deep resentment, illusion, and lack of readiness for development). The deformation arises from the traumatic nature of the very reality of this interaction, although this trauma is not inevitable. At the same time, these forms are familiar and convenient for the “players”, so it is not easy to realize these games and get out of them.

One of their common features is repeatability, even if the games take place under different circumstances and with different partners, and if they produce undesirable results for the player.

The subject-object paradigms prevail in the described civic games. The initiator of the game – regardless of whether it is a citizen or the state – more often see themselves as subjects than objects in their relations with the other party. Thus, the citizen tries to use the resources of the state despite its interests (sees himself as a subject, the state as an object); the state is ready to exploit the citizen, his property, and life time (sees itself as a subject, the citizen as an object of use).

Of course, we should focus on clarifying the specifics of the role of the State: Are we using a metaphor when we say that “the state manipulates” or “the state plays games” with citizens?

Only partially. Since we interpret the state as an organization of society, and an organization (as well

as a group, for example, a family) can literally, not metaphorically, but literally engage in manipulative interaction with an individual (an employee of the organization, a family member), the state can also engage in manipulative and gaming interaction with a citizen in the literal sense of the word. For this purpose, various media, tools of ideological influence, techniques of building the external image of the state, etc. are often used.

The State can be represented in different ways – as strong or weak, as an aggressor or a victim, and this portrayal is usually consistent with the Main Player’s standard behavior. In a citizen’s mind, the State is often personified as a representative of the authorities: a policeman, a manager, a state official. At the same time, the citizens – the Main Player and the Auxiliary Players – appeal specifically to the State in their narratives; they condemn the State (the State and the government are condemned separately), and enter into an internal dialogue with the State. The above implies that people do not confuse power with the State, but actually enter into relations with the State as citizens.

At the same time, the State can also derive real benefits or losses from “civic games”. Even if the State appears aggressive or weak, it may benefit from these perceptions because they enable the State to compensate for organizational defects. Every State makes at least minimal efforts to encourage an activity of citizen. Therefore, various initiatives on the part of the state, including manipulative gaming initiatives, are a reality.

Some games are motivated by State ideological systems. It is no accident that the image of the Soviet Man, a modest individual who was principled and devoted to work at the expense of his personal life, was sacralized in the USSR. In the ideology of the United States, the image of a hero who is devoted to his/her work and risks his/her life to ensure the safety of his/her fellow citizens, was similarly sacralized (the ranger Woker, for example). The hidden meaning of these ideologems is to encourage citizens to participate in games that are beneficial for the State.

An analysis of this manipulative game interaction is needed to find a way out of the game for both the citizen and the state as an organization.

### Conclusions

1. Manipulative-game interaction between a citizen and the state is a kind of unhealthy, subopti-



mal relationship between them. It is expressed in the so-called games, which are a surrogate/deformation of healthy relations between them and are aimed at achieving psychological (political) “winning” that creates the appearance of solving real problems in them/between them.

2. The above-mentioned game interaction is based mainly on the subject-object paradigm of relations between a citizen and the state, which means that the initiator of the game considers himself a subject and the other party to the relationship an object.

3. The participation of the state in manipulative game interaction with a citizen is not just a scientific metaphor. Since the state is an organization of society, it as an organization can carry out psychological manipulations in relation to a citizen aimed at illusory solution of legal/political and socio-psy-

chological problems. The point of this activity is to maintain the status quo.

4. Each game can be either symmetrical (“mirroring” the partner’s game – for example, games aimed at enrichment at the expense of the other party are observed both on the part of the citizen and the state) or asymmetrical (present only on one partner of the interaction). Nevertheless, all participants in games (both symmetrical and asymmetrical) receive psychological gains – a surrogate substitute for solving organizational problems.

The prospect of this research is further conceptual development of the above approaches, as well as the development of adequate methodological tools that would allow studying both manipulative gaming and other types of interaction between the citizen and the state.

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#### Information about author:

Khazratova Nigora – Doctor of Psychological Sciences, Professor of the Department of Clinical, Pedagogical and Developmental Psychology, University of Warmia and Mazury, Olsztyn, Poland, e-mail: [nigora.khazratova@uwm.edu.pl](mailto:nigora.khazratova@uwm.edu.pl)

**Автор туралы мәлімет:**

Хазратова Нигора Викторовна – психология ғылымдарының докторы, Вармия-Мазури университетінің клиникалық, педагогикалық және даму психологиясы кафедрасының профессоры, Ольштын, Польша, e-mail: [nigora.khazratova@uwm.edu.pl](mailto:nigora.khazratova@uwm.edu.pl)

**Сведения об авторе:**

Хазратова Нигора Викторовна – доктор психологических наук, профессор кафедры клинической, педагогической и психологии развития Варминско-Мазурского университета, Ольштын, Польша, e-mail: [nigora.khazratova@uwm.edu.pl](mailto:nigora.khazratova@uwm.edu.pl)

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